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Terry, Traffic Stops, and Tragedy: Conflicts and 
Concerns in the Wake of Kansas v. Glover 
Hunter J. Rodgers* 
 
ABSTRACT 
In early April of this year, the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Kansas v. Glover, and held that when an officer discovers that a 
passing vehicle’s registered owner has a revoked license, there is a 
commonsense inference sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for a 
traffic stop. A narrow holding at first glance, Glover stands on the 
precipice of almost immediate confrontation with other aspects of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. This essay aims to examine two of those 
confrontations: how the Glover inference will interact with both the 
prohibition against prolonged stops under Rodriguez v. United States as 
well as the exclusionary rule and its exceptions. Finally, this essay 
examines reasonable suspicion’s history and justifications in light of traffic 
stops’ disproportionate impact on the poor and communities of color, 
concluding that the standard does more to exacerbate police-citizen 
relations than it helps them. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Felix Frankfurter once wrote that the old adage “hard cases make bad law 
has its basis in experience,” but that “petty cases are even more calculated 
to make bad law.”1 Few things have caused a cavalcade of bad law more 
 
* © 2020 Hunter J. Rodgers, Esq. J.D. 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. 
The author wishes to thank J. Ryan Brown, Esq., and Sean Robinson, Esq., for putting up 
with his feverish ranting about this and other topics. The views expressed herein are 
entirely the author’s, and the author’s alone. 
252 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
than automobiles, especially when they intersect with the Fourth 
Amendment, which guarantees to people the right “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, from unreasonable searches and 
seizure” from government infringement.2 Although “beyond dispute” that 
vehicles are “effects” under the Fourth Amendment,3 vehicles have been 
categorically excepted from the warrant requirement for almost a century.4 
Initially, the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement 
applied only to searches based upon probable cause.5 But with the textual 
shift from the Warrant Clause to the Reasonableness Clause at the end of 
the 1960s,6 the probable cause requirement waned as reasonable suspicion 
waxed. However, nowhere did the rise of reasonable suspicion have a 
greater impact than on the automobile. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed the intersection between 
automobiles and reasonable suspicion in Kansas v. Glover.7 A short 
opinion, the Court in Glover stressed the narrowness of its holding: a 
computer check of a passing vehicle’s license plate which reveals the car’s 
registered owner has a revoked license, coupled with the commonsense 
inference that the registered owner is probably the driver, gives an officer 
reasonable suspicion to stop the car absent any information undermining 
 
1 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)). 
4 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
5 See id. at 153–54 (“It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent 
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus 
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of 
such a search.”). 
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20 (1968) (finding that stops and frisks plainly 
constituted searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, while simultaneously 
noting that “[i]f this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether ‘probable cause’ existed to 
justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case.”). 
7 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020). 
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that inference.8 Taken in isolation, it is. But in the context of the rest of the 
Fourth Amendment’s voluminous case law, several glaring issues rear their 
ugly heads. 
This essay seeks to address those concerns. After a brief overview of 
reasonable suspicion, Part II discusses the three opinions from Glover. Part 
III then turns to the impending conflicts: Part III-A addresses how Glover 
will interact with the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Rodriguez v. United 
States, which flatly prohibited any prolongation of a traffic stop’s duration.9 
Part III-B questions how Glover interacts with the Court’s recent attacks on 
the exclusionary rule. This rule requires courts to exclude evidence obtained 
by state actors in violation of the Fourth Amendment from any criminal 
trials stemming from that evidence. Finally, Part IV questions whether 
reasonable suspicion should be reconsidered in light of its impact on police 
and citizen relations. 
II. KANSAS V. GLOVER AS THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION OF 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
The bastard offspring of probable cause, reasonable suspicion is an 
intermediate standard under the Fourth Amendment. It requires “some 
minimal level of objective justification” beyond an “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”10 Reasonable suspicion was created 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren in Terry v. Ohio and is defined as “the amount 
of evidence required to [a]ffect a brief detention to investigate whether a 
crime has occurred, is occurring, or is imminently likely to occur.”11 In the 
 
8 Id. at 1186; see id. at 1191 (“We emphasize the narrow scope of our holding.”). 
9 See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). 
10 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and punctuation omitted). 
11 392 U.S. at 26 (1968); see Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the 
Post-Warren Court Dismantled the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 477, 496 
(2013) [hereinafter “Cloud”] (noting that in Terry “[f]or the first time the Court held that 
searches and seizures could be lawful although the investigating officers possessed 
neither probable cause nor a warrant or warrant exception.”) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
20). 
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half-century since establishing it as dogma in Terry, the Supreme Court 
Justices have examined reasonable suspicion in countless cases, distilling 
their interpretation of reasonable suspicion into certain key principles. 
First, reasonable suspicion requires that officers have “a particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity.”12 The amount of suspicion necessary for this stop varies. It 
depends upon both the content of the police officer’s information and the 
reliability of that information.13 Like probable cause, reasonable suspicion 
requires examining the “totality of the circumstances,” which simply means 
the whole picture.14 Certainty is not required; rather, courts must allow 
officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human 
behavior,”15 and the officers “need not rule out the possibility of innocent 
conduct.”16 That said, reasonable suspicion is not a heavy burden by any 
stretch of the imagination; the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to 
make certain of that. Officers can stop you for whatever reason they want, 
regardless of the legitimacy, so long as they have some pretextual 
 
12 Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014) (citation omitted). A modified form 
of suspicion is required for the eponymous Terry frisks, brief pat down searches of a 
person that officers reasonably believe to be armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 
27. Reasonable suspicion in the frisk context requires not only the particularized basis for 
suspecting criminal activity, but also that a particularized basis to suspect the person 
stopped is armed and dangerous. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (“To 
justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the 
case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor 
reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.”). 
These “protective searches” apply to cars as well: officers may conduct warrantless 
searches of a vehicle’s passenger compartment when they have reasonable suspicion that 
someone in the vehicle—regardless of driver or passenger—is “dangerous” and might 
access the vehicle to obtain a weapon. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346–47 
(2009); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
13 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
14 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
230–31 (1983) (applying totality of the circumstances test to probable cause). 
15 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
16 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). 
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justification ready to use when haled into court.17 Nor are officers required 
to know which law you broke, so long as they can point to one later—”even 
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.”18 
Second, traffic stops have long been considered akin to Terry stops, since 
officers in both only need to possess reasonable suspicion to stop 
someone.19 Any observed traffic violation validates a stop, regardless of the 
officer’s subjective intent in pulling someone over.20 Once stopped, officers 
can require vehicle occupants—including passengers—to give their names21 
and step out of the vehicle.22 That said, traffic stops, like Terry stops, are 
strictly limited to the time necessary to complete a traffic stop’s “mission”: 
to address the traffic violation and attend to any related safety concerns.23 
Officers are required to diligently pursue their investigation,24 and the 
seizure’s authority ends the moment the tasks tied to the stop are—or 
 
17 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
18 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2004); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 
54 (2014)). 
19 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998); see Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 
393, 396 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops—such as the 
traffic stop in this case—when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’”) 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)); Heien, 574 U.S. at 60 
(“[T]o justify this type of seizure, officers need only ‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . .”). 
20 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
21 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). 
22 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that 
government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety outweighs “de minimis” 
additional intrusion of requiring driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit vehicle); 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997) (applying Mimms to vehicle’s 
passengers). 
23 Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a 
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 
reasonably required to complete that mission.”). 
24 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (finding that courts determine 
stop’s reasonable duration by “examin[ing] whether the police diligently pursued [the] 
investigation.”). 
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reasonably should be—completed.25 Only by developing an additional 
reasonable suspicion during the stop may officers prolong the stop even a 
second beyond the amount of time necessary to complete their purpose.26 
All of which brings us to Kansas v. Glover.27 
Glover’s facts are simple—much to the chagrin of some of the justices.28 
While on routine patrol, a deputy with the local sheriff’s office in Kansas 
saw a pick-up truck driving along.29 The deputy ran the truck’s license plate 
through the Kansas Department of Revenue’s file service.30 The file service 
indicated that the truck belonged to the respondent, Charles Glover, Jr. and 
that his license had been revoked.31 Assuming that Glover was the vehicle’s 
driver, and despite neither observing any traffic infractions nor attempting 
to identify the truck’s driver, the deputy pulled the truck over and 
discovered Glover behind the wheel.32 After his arrest, Glover filed a 
motion to suppress.33 The trial court granted his motion, reasoning that 
because many families have multiple cars per household, someone other 
than the registered owner could be driving the car instead.34 The State 
appealed, and after trading reversals in the appellate ladder with Glover, the 
State petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari to 
review.35 
 
25 Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. 
26 See id. at 357. 
27 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020). 
28 See id. at 1192, 1194 (Kagan, J., concurring) (referring to “the parties’ unusually 
austere stipulation” and the “barebones stipulation” in “this strange case.”). 




33 State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182, 184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 
2018), rev’d and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020). 
34 Id. at 185. 
35 Id. For an excellent discussion of the lead-up to Glover, see Zach Kumar, On Kansas 
v. Glover and the Issue of Reasonable Suspicion, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
SIDEBAR 29 (2020). 
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In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court found it 
reasonable for the officer to initiate “an investigative traffic stop after 
running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner has 
a revoked driver’s license” because the officer lacked “information negating 
an inference that the owner” was the vehicle’s driver.36 Recognizing the 
State’s “vital interest” in ensuring both that only qualified persons operate 
vehicles and that those persons are complying with licensing, registration, 
and inspection requirements, the Glover Court found the fact that a 
vehicle’s registered owner is not always its driver did not negate the 
reasonableness of the deputy’s inference.37 Buttressed by empirical data and 
Kansas’s extensive list of reasons to suspend or revoke a driver’s license, 
the Court concluded that “[t]he concerns motivating the State’s various 
grounds for revocation len[t] further credence to the inference that a 
registered owner with a revoked Kansas driver’s license might be the one 
driving the vehicle.”38 Finally, the Court stressed its holding’s narrowness, 
providing as an example that “if an officer knows that the registered owner 
of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-
twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not ‘raise a suspicion 
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.’”39 
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the majority’s 
opinion.40 Rather than resting on a commonsense inference, the crucial 
detail for Justice Kagan was Glover’s revoked license because  Kansas 
“almost never revok[ed] a license except for serious or repeated driving 
offenses.”41 By virtue of the revocation, Glover had already shown “a 
willingness to flout driving restrictions,” thereby providing the reason to 
infer that he would drive without a license enough to warrant the traffic 
 
36 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020). 
37 Id. at 1188. 
38 Id. at 1189. 
39 Id. at 1191. 
40 Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
41 Id. at 1192. 
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stop.42 That said, Justice Kagan stressed the difference between a revoked 
license—based upon “[c]rimes like vehicular homicide and manslaughter, 
or vehicular flight from a police officer,” or even “multiple convictions for 
moving traffic violations within a short time”—and suspended licenses, 
which Kansas suspends for matters having nothing to do with road safety, 
“such as failing to pay parking tickets, court fees, or child support.”43 
Because several studies had found that “most license suspensions do not 
relate to driving at all; what they most relate to is being poor,” Justice 
Kagan doubted whether the majority’s inference would hold any value.44 
Finally, after explaining various ways that hypothetical defendants could 
have rebutted the license-revocation signal through cross-examining the 
officer about their observations, the car’s attributes, and even statistical 
evidence—all which were absent from “the parties’ unusually austere 
stipulation” list—Justice Kagan stressed that “in more fully litigated cases, 
the license-revocation alert does not (as it did here) end the inquiry.”45 
Justice Sotomayor wrote the lone dissent, raising two main issues with 
the majority opinion.46 First, she derided the majority’s shifting the burden 
of justifying a seizure—which had always rested upon the State47—onto the 
defendant by permitting police officers to conduct traffic stops “whenever 
they lack ‘information negating an inference’ that a vehicle’s unlicensed 
owner is its driver.”48 More importantly, Justice Sotomayor challenged the 
“commonsense inference” in light of the Court’s precedent stressing the 





45 Id. at 1194; see id. at 1193 (discussing ways of rebuttal). 
46 Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
47 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“It is the State’s 
burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable 
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure.”). 
48 Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1195–96 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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agent.”49 Given the Court’s history of reliance upon officers’ training, 
knowledge, and experience, diluting the reasonable suspicion standard to a 
“commonsense inference” served only to give officers “free rein to stop a 
vehicle involved in no suspicious activity simply because it is registered to 
an unlicensed person. That stop is based merely on a guess or a ‘hunch’ 
about the driver’s identity.”50 Finally, Justice Sotomayor undermined the 
revocation/suspension difference, pointing out that, although Kansas limits 
revocations for serious offenses, other states’ grounds for revocation can 
include offenses completely unrelated to driving offenses.51 Other states use 
“revocation” as temporary sanctions for things as mundane as failure to pay 
child support.52 Because vehicle stops interfere with freedom of movement, 
are inconvenient, consume time, and can create “substantial anxiety” 
through unsettling shows of authority, Justice Sotomayor dissented from the 
majority’s lowering of the (already minimal) burden of proof for reasonable 
suspicion.53 
III. NO “LOVE” IN GLOVER: HOW THE COURT’S DECISION WILL 
INTENSIFY CONFLICTS IN THE LAW OF TRAFFIC STOPS 
Glover answered a narrow issue with a narrow ruling, but rarely do those 
cases stay that way.54 Given the complexity of Fourth Amendment law, 
with its competing interests, doctrines, and analyses, Glover seems destined 
for conflict. From the intersection between the commonsense inference and 
 
49 Id. at 1194. 
50 Id. at 1196. 
51 Id. at 1198 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.560 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
61-5-206 (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-11-6 (2010)). 
52 Id. at 1198 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-201.1 (2011)). 
53 Id. 
54 See generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience. But 
petty cases are even more calculated to make bad law.”), overruled in part by Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). 
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prolonged stop case law to its impact on exclusion, Glover proves likely to 
have broader implications and to start fires. 
A. Glover vs. Rodriguez: When Does the Stop Prolong? 
Consider the Glover Court’s example of a way to rebut the commonsense 
inference when the vehicle’s registered owner’s description patently does 
not match the vehicle’s driver.55 The officer’s initial justification for the 
stop, the stop’s “mission,” is to investigate if the vehicle’s driver is the 
owner whose license is revoked. Once the car is pulled over and the officer 
sees that, instead of a mid-sixties man, the driver is a mid-twenties woman, 
this new information should dispel the reasonable suspicion. At that point, 
the traffic stop should terminate, Right? In light of the new information, the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion evaporates. It is then supplanted by the 
discovery that the driver is not the vehicle’s registered owner; as noted by 
the trial court in Glover,56 as well as in Justice Kagan’s concurrence,57 
reasonable suspicion ceases absent the inference that the owner is probably 
driving. 
The problem comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rodriguez v. United States, the most recent case to discuss prolonged 
detentions in traffic stops.58 Rodriguez emphasized that addressing the 
traffic infraction is the reason for the stop, so the stop can last only so long 
as necessary to do so.59 But at the same time, the Rodriguez Court clarified 
that a traffic stop’s mission is “to address the traffic violation that warranted 
 
55 Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191. 
56 See State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182, 185 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 
2018), rev’d and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (noting that the trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion to suppress by reasoning that “for a lot of families [where] there are 
multiple family members and multiple vehicles, that somebody other than the registered 
owner often is driving that vehicle.”). 
57 Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1193 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
58 Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). 
59 Id. at 354. Accord Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) 
(“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). 
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the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”60 Those safety concerns 
include making “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,” which 
generally involve checking driver’s license status, determining whether 
there are outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and 
proof of insurance.61 But when the initial justification for the stop is 
subsequently invalidated, like when discovering a teen is driving her 
uncle’s car, Can the officer nevertheless conduct the ordinary inquiries? 
There is no reasonable suspicion anymore for detaining the vehicle; that 
change in circumstances should cause the stop to terminate. Those ordinary 
inquiries occur as part of a traffic stop because they help to ensure that 
vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. All of this, 
however, is based upon the initial reason for the stop, which is generally the 
existence of a traffic violation. However, the Glover inference can be 
rebutted the moment the officer sees the driver does not match the vehicle 
owner’s description. 
There are two main ways that Glover and Rodriguez interactions play 
out. The first would be to rule in line with Supreme Court precedent 
authorizing “minimal” intrusions in vehicle stop contexts, like removing 
drivers or passengers from vehicles. Based upon this rationale, reviewing 
courts would find that the State’s “weighty interest” in officer safety, 
combined with the equally weighty interest in roadway safety, authorizes 
the officer to conduct the ordinary inquiries. After all, the “ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”62 Utilizing the 
balancing test created by the Court in Terry,63 courts would weigh “the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
 
60 Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
61 Id. (citation omitted). 
62 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 
U.S. 54, 60 (2014)); accord Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014). 
63 See Cloud, supra note 11, at 497. 
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justify the intrusion.”64 Here, the government’s interests would be weighty, 
while the individual’s interest would be comparatively minimal. The officer 
would discover that the vehicle’s driver was not its registered owner, but 
that would affect only the initial inference. The officer would have no way 
of knowing whether the vehicle’s driver in fact had a valid license, or that 
the car was properly licensed, registered, and insured. Given the prevalence 
of motor vehicles in America today,65 and the inherent safety concerns 
officers face every time they pull someone over,66 a court could reasonably 
rule that the traffic stop was not prolonged by the officer’s ordinary 
inquiries.67 
Frankly, I doubt that this would be the outcome in this scenario for three 
reasons. First, the facts warranting reasonable suspicion—fact, really—
were undermined by the officer’s discovery of the driver. If reasonable 
suspicion requires considering “the whole picture,” then that picture 
evaporates the moment the inference is rebutted. Allowing a stop to 
continue when the original justification has vanished is impermissible in 
any other kind of Terry stop.68 If an officer sees someone come out of a bar 
one night, start walking down the street, and then stumble and sway, that 
 
64 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (quoting Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 
65 See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018). 
66 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (discussing how in 1994 alone, 
5,762 officers were assaulted and eleven were killed during traffic stops); See United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) (discussing how “a significant 
percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic 
stops.”). See also United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Law 
enforcement officials literally risk their lives each time they approach occupied vehicles 
during the course of investigative traffic stops.”). 
67 See United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1540 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Considering 
the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year, the 
almost simultaneous computer check of a person’s criminal record, along with his or her 
license and registration, is reasonable and hardly intrusive.”). 
68 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“[A]n investigative detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.”). 
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behavior warrants an investigative detention for public drunkenness. But if 
the person stopped turns to the officer promptly, speaks clearly and 
cogently, and does not smell of alcohol, that initial suspicion dissipates. For 
the officer then to follow-up with additional questions prolongs the 
detention without any objective basis.69 
In the wake of Rodriguez, courts have been cracking down on unrelated 
questioning by officers during traffic stops.70 It makes no sense to allow the 
police to continue to detain a vehicle and its passengers while conducting 
ordinary inquiries if the officer initiated the stop based on an inference that 
vanished the second the officer saw the driver. The fact that the driver is not 
the registered owner could suggest something nefarious, but that is a leap 
that will not even clear reasonable suspicion’s low bar. Rather than 
objective facts from which inferences may arise, continuing a stop because 
the officer believes the driver may have stolen the car from the registered 
owner “would not much differ from a ‘mere hunch’—and so ‘not create 
reasonable suspicion.’”71 
Second, I struggle to see how officer safety is more strongly promoted by 
allowing the inquiries rather than simply by releasing the driver to go about 
their business. Again, the justification for the ordinary inquiries is 
predicated upon the fact that the stopped vehicle’s driver did something to 
 
69 Cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“While the legality of consensual encounters between police and citizens should be 
preserved, we do not believe that this legality should be used by police officers to turn a 
routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.”) (citation 
omitted). 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 970 F.3d 1342, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding 
that twenty-five seconds of unrelated questioning prolonged stop); United States v. Clark, 
902 F.3d 404, 410–11 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that twenty seconds of unrelated questions 
impermissibly extended traffic stop); see also United States v. Callison, 436 F. Supp.3d 
1218, 1125 (S.D. Iowa), appeal filed, 20-1398 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2020) (“The [Rodriguez] 
Court did not say ‘adds material time’ or ‘adds unreasonable time’ or ‘adds less-than-a-
minute of time.’ It said adds time.”) (footnote omitted). 
71 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1192–93 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting 
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)). 
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indicate less-than-perfect dedication to the rules of the road.72 Of course, 
this case is dealing exclusively with Glover’s inference; if the officer 
observes something that gives reason for a continued detention, that is a 
separate source of suspicion justifying a separate investigation.  But where 
the officer pulls someone over because a license plate reader tells them that 
the vehicle’s registered owner’s license has been revoked, then that 
inference’s abrogation should terminate the stop, minimizing the officer’s 
risk of harm. 
Third and finally, allowing the officer to still conduct the ordinary 
inquiries even after the reasonable suspicion disappears runs almost straight 
into the random license checks the Supreme Court rejected forty years ago 
in Delaware v. Prouse.73 The Prouse Court disavowed discretionary license 
checks by police officers specifically because these checks would authorize 
Terry stops based upon neither an “appropriate factual basis for suspicion 
directed at a particular automobile,” nor upon some “other substantial and 
objective standard or rule to govern” officers’ exercise of discretion.74 
Allowing officers to conduct traffic stops based upon the Glover 
inference—which is rebutted immediately upon contact with the driver—
yet, still allowing the ordinary inquiries is precisely the kind of 
“standardless and unconstrained discretion” that the Fourth Amendment 
guards against.75 
Given the conflicting precedent, the narrowness of Glover’s holding, and 
the risk of arbitrary seizures, reviewing courts should reject any attempts to 
 
72 See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (noting that “[a] ‘warrant check makes it possible to 
determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic 
offenses.’”) (quoting 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §9.3(c), 516 (6th ed. 
2020)) (emphasis added). 
73 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
74 Id. at 661. 
75 Id. 
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circumvent with two steps instead of one that the Supreme Court already 
rejected in Prouse and affirmed in Rodriguez.76 
B. Glover vs. the Exclusionary Rule 
Assuming a court agrees with the argument above, an officer should not 
continue his questioning after the Glover inference has been rebutted. If the 
officer’s illegal investigation discovers contraband, Does the exclusionary 
rule apply? Though some may think it does, or that it should, those people 
do not make up five members of the Supreme Court, which in the 21st 
century has gone out of its way to undermine and curtail the rule’s 
application.77 
1. Utah v. Strieff as the Prelude to Glover 
Take what I anticipate will soon be a likely scenario: An officer asks 
those ordinary inquiries and discovers that the driver has an outstanding 
warrant. During the arrest, they discover contraband on the driver. Does 
that trigger suppression? The officer discovered the warrant based solely 
upon the information discovered through the driver’s prolonged (or even 
unjustifiable) detention. It was not inevitable that the evidence would have 
 
76 Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920) (rejecting 
government’s argument that exclusionary rule articulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914), “is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our 
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.”). 
77 See Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should it Be?, 
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 341 (2013) (referring to U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions as “reveal[ing] a Court that is now willing to take much larger bites out of the 
rule, and perhaps even swallow it whole.”); Rohith v. Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as 
Fourth Amendment Judicial Review, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179, 180 (2012) 
(“Proponents of the exclusionary rule are playing a goal-line defense.”); Morgan Cloud, 
A Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled the Exclusionary 
Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 477, 477–78 (2013) (“[O]ver the past four decades the 
Supreme Court has devised doctrines rooted neither in the constitutional text nor its 
history that have transmogrified the exclusionary remedy from a core element of Fourth 
Amendment rights into a nuisance.”). 
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been discovered; the stop should not have occurred,78 nor was there an 
alternative, independent source for the contraband’s discovery.79 
Here we run into the Supreme Court’s most recent case on the 
exclusionary doctrine, Utah v. Strieff.80 Another opinion pitting Justice 
Thomas in the majority against Justice Sotomayor in the dissent, the Strieff 
Court held that when officers illegally stop someone without reasonable 
suspicion and during the detention discover an outstanding warrant, 
evidence discovered during a subsequent search incident to arrest is 
sufficiently attenuated from the initial stop’s illegality to warrant an 
exception from the exclusionary rule.81 The conflict with Glover arises from 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff, where she pointed out the flaw with 
using bench warrants to attenuate an illegal seizure’s fruits. Foreshadowing 
her concerns in Glover itself, Justice Sotomayor questioned the majority’s 
reliance upon outstanding warrants, given both the ubiquity of their use and 
their tendency to originate from minor infractions.82 To allow the 
 
78 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (defining inevitable discovery 
exception to exclusionary rule as where “prosecution can establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means” unconnected to illegal search or seizure). 
79 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (defining independent source 
exception as applying “to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an 
unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial 
illegality”); accord Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) 
(“If knowledge of [the facts obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation] is gained 
from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge 
gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.”). 
80 Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
81 Id. at 2059. 
82 Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing how”[o]utstanding warrants are 
surprisingly common,” with courts issuing them for things as simple as “[w]hen a person 
with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or court appearance,” or “[w]hen a person on 
probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew,” let alone “the ‘staggering’ number of 
warrants, ‘drawers and drawers’ full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and 
ordinance infractions,”) (quoting Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department 47, 55 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
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attenuation in Strieff to apply in situations where the Glover inference has 
been rebutted all but opens the floodgates to illegal stops, allowing officers 
to detain and arrest individuals with impunity. Even in Strieff, the officers 
were investigating something rather than casting lines and hoping for 
bites.83 
To the chagrin of civil libertarians, the answer is that Strieff will likely 
apply. Although the officer conducted an unauthorized investigation based 
on an unconstitutional detention, the Strieff Court made plain that 
discovering the outstanding warrant was enough to break the causal link 
between the officers’ illegal conduct and the contraband’s discovery.84 At 
the same time, there may be a possible way to distinguish Strieff if the 
person whose name returns with an outstanding warrant is the passenger, 
rather than the driver. Unlike in Strieff, which was an on-the-street 
encounter as opposed to a vehicle stop, the hypothetical officer had no 
reason whatsoever to run warrant checks on the passenger. The Ninth 
Circuit even held last year that because a passenger’s identity ordinarily has 
“no relation to a driver’s safe operation of a vehicle,” demanding the 
passenger’s identification is not part of the traffic stop’s mission.85 That 
said, the Ninth Circuit’s view is the minority, with other federal circuits and 
state courts finding that the passenger’s identification is a permissible 





83 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059 (discussing the officers’ investigating narcotics 
activity). 
84 Id. at 2062. 
85 United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2019). 
86 See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 424 P.3d 83, 88–89 (Utah 2017) (collecting cases where 
federal courts upheld officers’ ability to request passenger identification); State v. Allen, 
779 S.E.2d 248, 255–56 (Ga. 2015) (authorizing officers to demand identification and 
collecting authorities). 
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2. The Glover Inference and Negligent Records 
Consider a different scenario—What happens when the officer’s Glover 
inference is based upon a revoked license status and later determined to be 
erroneous? For example, the registered owner’s license was revoked but 
subsequently reinstated, and the computer system is outdated. Does that 
undermine the officer’s investigation? 
Again, it is doubtful that this scenario does undermine the officer’s 
investigation. The Supreme Court has already exempted clerical laziness 
from triggering exclusion, regardless of whether the outdated information is 
due to police negligence or someone else’s.87 Although the Court in 
Herring v. United States hedged in this regard, noting that if the police have 
been reckless in maintaining their records, then exclusion could apply,88 
this does little to promote Fourth Amendment protections or police 
accountability. It also places a greater burden on defendants to show the 
“widespread pattern of violations” necessary to circumvent the good-faith 
exception, which is evidence that may prove inordinately more difficult to 
find.89 
In a worst-case scenario, Herring effectively insulates police use of 
automated license-plate readers, also known as ALPRs, which are devices 
affixed to patrol vehicles that use optical character recognition to scan 
license plates of passing cars.90 Police departments across the country have 
 
87 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (excepting from exclusionary rule evidence 
obtained from arrest stemming from officer’s good faith reliance upon computer system 
which showed defendant had active warrant, later determined to have been recalled but 
not updated due to court clerk’s negligence); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 
(2009) (extending Evans to police databases). 
88 Id. at 146. 
89 Id. at 146–47 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see Kay L. Levine 
et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring World, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
627, 648–50 (2017) (researching the effect of Herring and determining lower courts 
relied on it to insulate police 80% of the time). 
90 See License Plate Recognition Systems, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION 
CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/licenseplates/ [https://perma.cc/E9QL-XNP4]. 
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already started using ALPRs, and two-thirds of departments having 100 or 
more officers utilize ALPRs.91 That number jumps to over 90% for 
departments in cities with more than one million people.92 However, this 
technology is far from perfect, with errors not only in reading passing 
license plates but also in maintaining outdated records systems.93 What 
happens when the Glover inference collides with these ALPR systems? If a 
computer hit authorizes police to pull someone over, it will inevitably 
encourage departments to maintain records past their sell-by date. It creates 
a win-win scenario for police because if their system is up to date, then 
Glover authorizes the stop, but if the system is outdated, then Herring 
excuses it. But when the police have a win-win situation, generally it is the 
public who loses. 
Police departments use ALPRs in other ways than inside patrol vehicles. 
Due to their small size, ALPRs can be placed on light poles, buildings, and 
even on traffic cones.94 With so many cameras, each running ALPR 
software, police can effectively track a person’s movements across a city as 
accurately as GPS tracking. The Supreme Court previously ruled that 
people do not have a protected privacy interest in the exterior of their cars;95  
because the ALPRs never physically touch passing vehicles, no trespass 
violations occur to trigger the Fourth Amendment.96 There may be an 
argument to support a privacy interest rooted in the Court’s recent decision 
 
91 Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) & Twenty-Two Technical 
Experts & Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8–9, Kansas v. 
Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (citations omitted) (No. 18-556). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 13. 
94 Id. at 8. 
95 See United States v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (finding it “unreasonable to have 
an expectation of privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily 
in plain view from the exterior of the automobile.”). 
96 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” because the Government had “physically 
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”). 
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in Carpenter v. United States, with its claim of seeking to “assure 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”97 If the Court was serious in 
accepting that “as ‘subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy 
have become available to the Government,’” it has the duty “to ensure that 
the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections,” 
then the advent of ALPRs should warrant careful scrutiny.98 Courts should 
refuse to tolerate even the appearance of gamesmanship from police in their 
use. For instance, if a defendant can prove that the police are intentionally 
or recklessly failing to update their systems so as to take advantage of 
Glover and Herring, then good faith should not apply.99 However, the 
situation looks grim. In April, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that 
although ALPRs’ widespread use could rise to an invasion of someone’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it did not occur in the case before 
them.100 This ruling came despite the fact that the case involved the police 
investigating the defendant for drug distribution by using ALPRs to not 
only track his movements over two bridges, but also “access historical data, 
which revealed the number of times he had crossed the bridges over a three-
month period,” and receive real-time alerts.101 
 
97 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (punctuation omitted) 
(citation omitted). 
98 Id. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
99 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”). 
100 See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1095 (Mass. 2020). 
101 Id. contra Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning whether 
individuals “reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a 
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
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IV. SHOULD THE COURT RECONSIDER REASONABLE SUSPICION 
IN THE WAKE OF GLOVER? 
Since the Court created reasonable suspicion, it has authorized police to 
consider your ethnicity,102 where you live,103 what you wear,104 and how 
you behave105 as factors for consideration. As it stands now, reasonable 
suspicion has more in common with Tinder than with the Fourth 
Amendment.106 Scholars have sought to justify the Terry case as an original 
matter, but routinely find no answer.107 Part of that lies in Chief Justice 
Warren rejecting the Warrant Clause’s procedural safeguards and instead 
rooting the Terry analysis in the “reasonableness clause.” 108 He created a 
balancing test whereby courts weigh the government’s interest in “effective 
crime prevention and detection” in one corner and the individual’s interest 
 
102 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). 
103 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). 
104 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1989). 
105 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). 
106 Tinder is an online and smartphone-based program for meeting people and dating, 
criticized for its “swipe” system—which lets people choose to reject or “like” someone’s 
profile, usually based on several photos of that person—as encouraging users to judge 
people based on their appearances alone. See, e.g., Rachel Hosie, Tinder Update Allows 
Users to Focus on Looks Without Being Distracted by Personality, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 
6, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/tinder-update-looks-pictures-
not-personality-bio-dating-app-shallow-appearance-a7986796.html 
[https://perma.cc/8TB4-EHHV]; Katie Moritz, Why You Can’t Judge a Date by Their 
Photo, REWIRE (Jul. 24, 2017), https://www.rewire.org/online-dating-photo/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RYV-2RVQ]. 
107 Sophie J. Hart & Dennis M. Martin, Essay, Judge Gorsuch and the Fourth 
Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 132, 136 (2017) (“Terry was a pragmatic—not an 
originalist—approach. Scholars and judges seeking a historical hook for Terry have 
uncovered little evidence linking Terry’s stop and frisks to police actions at common 
law”); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave 
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 915–16 (2002) (noting 
how reasonable suspicion was “[c]reated in 1968,” that it “has no roots in Framing-era 
law, as a reasonable suspicion test was unknown to legal scholars at that time,” and that it 
“has absolutely no nexus with the text of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
108 Cloud, supra note 11, at 495 (“In 1968, Terry v. Ohio abandoned the warrant-based 
procedural “face” of the Amendment and sanctioned some searches and seizures 
violating all of the requirements imposed by the Warrant Clause”) (footnote omitted). 
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in personal security in the other.109 To the surprise of few, though, far too 
often, the Court “balances” these two factors and finds that societal needs 
outweigh individual rights.110 Contrary to what the Supreme Court holds 
now,111 the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is not “reasonableness.” 
The Framers understood “unreasonable” searches and seizures to be those 
against the reason of the common law, which means those procedures found 
in the Warrant Clause: probable cause, oath or affirmation, and 
particularity.112 Worse, Terry’s balancing test has more in common with 
equal protection scrutiny than with the Fourth Amendment—and a rational 
basis test, at that, despite being a fundamental right.113 Finally, by 
 
109 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 22 (1968). But see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
393 (1978) (“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can 
never by itself justify disregard of [constitutional rights].”). 
110 Arthur Leavens, The Fourth Amendment and Surveillance in a Digital World, 27 J. 
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 709, 745 (2015) (discussing how in interest-balancing, “the 
government side of the balance is easy to over-value, particularly in an age of seemingly 
ubiquitous terrorist plots, . . . while the privacy-liberty side of the balance may seem an 
extravagance, particularly to those who cannot picture themselves subject to such 
investigative attention.”). For an excellent example of interest balancing’s futility 
compared against constitutional rights, see Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1401–
02 (2020). 
111 See, e.g., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014); Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009); 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
112 See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 
1264 (2016) (“Although, at least since 1967, the concept of ‘unreasonable’ has become 
untethered from the original meaning, the word itself implied something different in the 
eighteenth century. ‘Unreasonable’ translated into ‘against reason,’ or against “the 
Reason of the Common Law’”) (footnotes and citations omitted); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 299, 330–37 (2010) (examining Terry from originalist standpoint and finding that 
“Terry’s central innovation—permitting detention and frisk on a predicate that could not 
support an arrest—has no support in the nightwalker statutes or any other framing-era 
practice.”). 
113 See Clark v. Jeter, 386 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (discussing how courts consider equal 
protection challenges under “different levels of scrutiny to different types of 
classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or national origin, and 
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authorizing searches and seizures at less than probable cause, the Terry 
Court opened the door to arbitrary interference by the State—exactly what 
the Fourth Amendment was designed to ward against.114 
Consider how the Glover inference disproportionately impacts low-
income communities because, although it is now “reasonable” to infer a 
registered owner is likely the vehicle’s driver, shared vehicles in low-
income families skews that inference. Additionally, Justice Kagan’s 
concerns about license suspension’s relation to poverty115 bear fruit: 71% of 
license suspensions in Florida are for unpaid court debt, 62% of the three-
million-plus suspensions Ohio issued in 2017 alone were unrelated to 
driving, and 56% of license suspensions in Wisconsin were issued for 
unpaid parking tickets.116 Rather than levying taxes to fund public expenses, 
many municipalities have turned to increased ticketing and traffic 
enforcement as a source of revenue. For example, the town of Ferguson, 
Missouri—home of Michael Brown and the birthplace of the Black Lives 
Matter movement—collected $2.4 million in fines and fees in 2013 alone, 
second only to taxes as the municipality’s income source.117 Although 
Glover’s inference authorizes only a traffic stop—one that should hopefully 
 
classifications affecting fundamental rights, are given the most exacting scrutiny.”) 
(citations omitted). 
114 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (discussing how courts “must 
‘assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001)). 
115 Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1192 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
116 Brief for Fines and Fees Justice Center et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 7, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (citations omitted) (No. 18-
556). 
117 Eric Markowitz, The Link Between Money and Aggressive Policing, NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-link-between-money-
and-aggressive-policing [https://perma.cc/S2LP-LJ85]; see Torie Atkinson, A Fine 
Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New 
Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 225–26 (2016) (discussing the 
Ferguson police’s multiple unconstitutional practices to better funnel fine monies to the 
local government). 
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terminate the moment the officer realizes that the vehicle’s driver is not the 
registered owner—traffic stops do more than simply interfere with freedom 
of movement, inconvenience drivers, and consume time; traffic stops 
“create substantial anxiety” from the police’s “unsettling show of authority” 
to the driver.118 They are fraught with potentially lethal consequences for 
both officers and those who are pulled over. 
Just as traffic stops have made targets out of the poor, so too has 
reasonable suspicion case law affected marginalized communities. By 
authorizing police to make “investigative detentions” of someone based 
upon their race, their clothes, their location, and their demeanor, reasonable 
suspicion has overwhelmingly impacted communities of color at 
monstrously disproportionate rates. The Stanford University Open Policing 
Project examined almost 100 million traffic stops conducted from 2011 to 
2017, concluding that “police stopped and searched [B]lack and Latino 
drivers on the basis of less evidence than used in stopping white drivers, 
who are searched less often but are more likely to be found with illegal 
items.”119 Combined with the Court’s condonation of pretextual stops in 
Whren v. United States,120 the Court has effectively authorized the practice 
of singling out minorities for pretextual traffic stops in the hope of 
discovering contraband.121 
Consider all the police shootings that have occurred in the past few years. 
Philando Castile was shot five times during a traffic stop while reaching for 
his identification after informing the officer he had a firearm.122 Maurice 
 
118 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979). 
119 See Erik Ortiz, Inside 100 Million Police Traffic Stops: New Evidence of Racial Bias, 
CBS NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/inside-100-
million-police-traffic-stops-new-evidence-racial-bias-n980556 [https://perma.cc/79HZ-
ZHDW] (citing The Stanford Open Policing Project, STANFORD UNIV., 
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/5ZW9-SQ2J]). 
120 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
121 I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 862 (2008). 
122 Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said About the 
Shooting, WASH. POST (Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
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Gordon was killed by a police officer during a traffic stop in June 2020, 
despite the fact that the officer already frisked him and found no 
weapons.123 Samuel DuBose was another unarmed Black man who was shot 
in the head by a campus police officer during a traffic stop.124 Walter Scott 
was also shot in the back by a South Carolina police officer during a traffic 
stop.125 In 2015 alone, over 100 people were killed by police during routine 
traffic stops, a third of whom were Black.126 Post-Terry, courts are 
supposed to determine a search or seizure’s “reasonableness” by balancing 
the invasion of the individual’s privacy against the degree to which the 
invasion is needed “for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”127 However, what “legitimate governmental interests” result from 
killing people during traffic stops? The courts and other criminal justice 
officials have tolerated and even sanctioned the injustices people of color 
experience; can anyone be surprised that the perpetually mistreated 




123 Tracey Tully, A Black Man Is Killed by a Trooper. His Family Wants Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/nyregion/maurice-gordon-
nj-killed.html [https://perma.cc/F2CZ-PC4P]. 
124 Charles M. Blow, The Shooting of Samuel DuBose, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 29, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/opinion/charles-blow-the-shooting-of-samuel-
dubose.html [https://perma.cc/93SR-CWUE]. 
125 Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder 
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-
in-black-mans-death.html [https://perma.cc/7GQS-C499]. 
126 Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal Traffic Stops, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-
disproportionate-number-of-black-victims-in-fatal-traffic-stops/2015/12/24/c29717e2-
a344-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html [https://perma.cc/4J5M-MJQT]. 
127 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 654 (1979) (determining lawfulness by balancing privacy and law enforcement 
interests); United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (determining 
lawfulness by balancing privacy and law enforcement interests). 
128 Angela Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442 (1997). 
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Support for reasonable suspicion proves less than convincing. As an 
original matter, the fact that a brief, investigative detention would not 
trigger Fourth Amendment protections at the time of the Framing because it 
is less than an arrest129 ignores just how transformative Terry has been to 
the American legal lexicon. At the Framing, to arrest someone meant “to 
obstruct; to stop; to check or hinder motion”130—which is exactly what a 
Terry stop is. Nor is it convincing to argue that vehicles are subject to 
“pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls” to justify 
traffic stops.131 For instance, one 2011 study published in the American 
Journal of Criminal Law found that people rejected the automobile 
exception by a 52.3% to 35.8% margin as a barometer of reasonable 
privacy expectations in vehicles.132 Same with the Terry Court’s refusal to 
blind itself  “to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves 
and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack 
probable cause for an arrest.”133 If officers lack probable cause for an arrest, 
there is a simple solution: Investigate.134 The freedom from unreasonable 
 
129 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (“There is some suggestion in the use of such 
terms as ‘stop’ and ‘frisk’ that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the 
meaning of the Constitution.”). 
130 Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), 
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/arrest [https://perma.cc/4RG5-78CH]. 
131 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); accord California v. Carney, 
471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (referring to “the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of 
traveling on the public highways.”). 
132 Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 364 
(2011). 
133 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
134 Cf. Falkner v. State, 98 So. 691, 693 (Miss. 1924) (discussing how freedom from 
search and seizure will inevitably “restrict the activity and the efficiency of the law–
enforcing officers, and necessarily some mischief must go undiscovered sometimes; but 
this was regarded as a less evil than giving officers unrestricted power to invade the 
property and houses of the citizen in search of evidence.”); Underwood v. State, 78 S.E. 
1103, 1106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) (referring to the freedom from search and seizure and the 
privilege against self-incrimination as “sacred civil jewels” brought over in the common 
law, ripped from tyrants’ unwilling hands by the apostles of personal liberty and personal 
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searches and seizures exists for a reason, and it is rooted in the abuses 
experienced by the Founders at the hands of the British—which had more 
in common with modern police forces than the constables of old. With 
“roots that are deep in our history,” the probable cause standard “represents 
the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum 
justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest 
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”135 Rather than relegating 
probable cause to merely “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ 
against the claims of police efficiency,”136 pre-Terry courts consistently 
applied a straightforward, general rule: Get a warrant.137 That some 
criminals may escape capture and punishment is troubling, but so too is the 
systemic injustice reasonable suspicion has promulgated. It is a truism that 
constitutional protections have costs,138 but the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights “necessarily takes certain policy choices off the 
table.”139 
 
security. They are hallowed by the blood of a thousand struggles, and were stored away 
for safe–keeping in the casket of the Constitution. It is infidelity to forget them; it is 
sacrilege to disregard them; it is despotic to trample upon them). 
135 Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2013) (quoting Henry v. United States, 
361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
136 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)). 
137 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
138 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (II) (1988). 
139 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008); cf. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (“The Framers…knew that judges, like other government 
officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people…. They were 
loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. By replacing categorical 
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their 
design.”); Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1101 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment) (“Judges are not well suited to strike the right ‘balance’ between [such] 
incommensurable interests. Nor do I think it is our role to do so. The People, through 
ratification, have already weighed the policy tradeoffs that constitutional rights entail. 
Those tradeoffs are thus not for us to reevaluate.”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Already a negligible burden, Kansas v. Glover decreased reasonable 
suspicion’s requirements even further. Though claiming to be a narrow 
holding, Glover may soon confront several other doctrines in the Terry 
traffic stop analysis. Questions regarding the interplay between Glover’s 
inference and prolonged stop case law under Rodriguez are almost certain 
to arise. So too with the inevitable clash with the Roberts Court’s 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, especially in light of the looming 
specter of mass surveillance under automated license plate readers. If 
Glover has shown us anything, it is the inherently fickle, unreliable, and 
unconstitutional nature of reasonable suspicion, which historically has been 
abused by police officers—often at the expense of the liberty, the 
livelihood, and the lives of persons of color. Perhaps it may one day serve 
as the motivating factor to see reasonable suspicion’s incursion upon the 
Fourth Amendment repudiated—much like other misguided rules 
promulgated from the impact of automobiles.140 Until then, courts should 
stay vigilant in defending the people’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures from stealthy encroachments, masking under the false 
talisman of law enforcement efficiency.141 
 
 
140 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. n.6 
(comparing the rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)—”suspicion less search 
of a car permitted upon arrest of the driver”—with the rule in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332 (2009)—”on second thought, no.”). 
141 Cf. Morgan v. State, 151 N.E. 98, 100 (Ind. 1926) (“The expression, ‘the end justifies 
the means,’ has never been adopted as a part of the legal jurisprudence of this state”); 
Underwood v. State, 78 S.E. 1103, 1106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914) (rejecting idea that “in the 
effort to detect crime and to punish the criminal ‘the end justifies the means.’ This is 
especially not true when the means adopted are violative of the very essence of 
constitutional free government.”). 
